

# Dynamic and Transparent Analysis of Commodity Production Systems

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


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
<sup>2</sup>University of California, Berkeley

25<sup>th</sup> IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Software Engineering (ASE '10)

# How to debug a device driver?




# How to debug a device driver?



Kernel debugger

# How to debug a device driver?



# How to analyze run-time properties of a system?

## Properties we would like to monitor:

- ★ Creation of new processes (or threads)
- ★ Execution of system calls
- ★ Execution of kernel/user functions
- ★ Access to hardware devices
- ★ Memory access
- ★ ...

## Possible applications

- ★ Profiling
- ★ Tracing

- ★ **Debugging**
- ★ Dynamic instrumentation

# Kernel-based solutions



- ★ Require the installation of specific hooks in the kernel
- ★ The analysis tool is implemented as a **kernel module**
- ★ To analyze kernel-level code, these approaches leverage another kernel-level module . . .

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**. . . it is like a dog chasing its tail!**



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- ★ The target system must be **already running inside a VM!**
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**Have you ever tried to use your iPod through a VM?**

A framework to perform dynamic system-level analyses  
of commodity production systems

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## Features


1. Does not require any native support for the analysis  
(can be used on commodity or closed-source systems)
2. Supports the analysis of running systems  
(the target must not be rebooted)
3. User- and system-level code cannot detect nor affect the analysis infrastructure
4. Guarantees isolation of the analysis tools running on its top  
(a buggy tool does not cause the target system to crash)

## Exploit hardware support for virtualization



- ★ A running system is migrated into a virtual machine **on-the-fly**
- ★ The analysis framework runs **at the hypervisor privilege level**  
(it is more privileged than the OS and completely isolated)




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



# A glimpse at hardware-assisted virtualization (Intel VT-x)



- ★ The OS needs not to be modified
- ★ The hardware guarantees transparency & isolation
- ★ Minimal overhead



# A glimpse at hardware-assisted virtualization (Intel VT-x)



An exit/entry event causes the CPU to save the state of the guest/host inside the VMCS




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


The events that trigger an exit to root mode can be configured **dynamically**

# Overview of the framework




# Overview of the framework




The framework is installed **as the target system runs** and is completely separated from the analyzed OS

# Overview of the framework




The analyzed OS **needs not to be modified** at all  
(i.e., the approach can be applied to closed-source OSes)

# Overview of the framework




The analysis tool runs in an **isolated execution environment** (a defect in the tool does not affect the stability of the OS)

# Overview of the framework




At the end of the analysis, the infrastructure  
can be **removed on-the-fly**

# Architecture




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





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
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
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
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
# Architecture



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# Architecture



# Which events can be intercepted?

- ★ Events cause exits to root mode
- ★ All the events exit **conditionally**
- ★ Conditions are expressed as boolean conditions

```
(process_name = "notepad.exe" ^ syscall_name = "NtReadFile")
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(process_name = "notepad.exe" ^ syscall_name = "NtReadFile")
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## Native events vs high-level events

- ★ Traced directly through the hardware
- ★ Very low-level operations (e.g., CPU exception)

- ★ Traced through low-/high-level events
- ★ High-level operations (e.g., Return from function)

# A summary of the events

Event	Exit cause	Native exit
ProcessSwitch	Change of page table address	✓
Exception	Exception	✓
Interrupt	Interrupt	✓
BreakpointHit	Debug or page fault except.	
WatchpointHit	Page fault except.	
FunctionEntry	Break on function entry point	
FunctionExit	Break on return address	
SyscallEntry	Break on syscall entry point	
SyscallExit	Break on return address	
IIOperationPort	Port read/write	✓
IIOperationMmap	Watchpoint on device memory	

# High-Level Events

- ★ Two main high-level events: `watchpoints` and `breakpoints`
- ★ Other high-level events are traced through the previous ones (e.g., `FunctionEntry`, `SyscallEntry`, ...)

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How to set watchpoints and breakpoints  
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## Watchpoints

- ★ No native support from VT-x, few **hardware watchpoints** shared with the guest
- ★ Implemented by protecting memory pages and trapping access exceptions

# High-Level Events

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## Breakpoints

- ★ No native support from VT-x, few **hardware breakpoints** shared with the guest
- ★ **Software breakpoints** are efficient, but can be detected (the byte at the breakpoint address must be modified)
- ★ Alternatively, breakpoints can be implemented through **watchpoints** (transparent but not very efficient)

## CPU registers

- ★ Inspection & manipulation is trivial
- ★ Guest registers are stored inside the VMCS

## Memory

- ★ Memory inspection & manipulation requires MMU virtualization
- ★ We mimic the behavior of the hardware MMU to translate VA  $\rightarrow$  PHY and map the physical page

# OS-dependent interface

- ★ OS-independent analysis can be uncomfortable  
(e.g., refer to a process by means of its PT base address)
- ★ OS-dependent APIs can ease the analysis  
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Name	Description
<code>GetFuncAddr(<i>n</i>)</code>	Return the address of the function <i>n</i>
<code>GetFuncName(<i>a</i>)</code>	Return the name of the function at address <i>a</i>
<code>GetProcName(<i>p</i>)</code>	Get the name of process with page directory base address <i>p</i>
<code>GetProcPID(<i>p</i>)</code>	Get the PID of process with page directory base address <i>p</i>
<code>GetProcLibs(<i>p</i>)</code>	Enumerate DLLs loaded into process <i>p</i>
<code>GetProcStack(<i>p</i>)</code>	Get the stack base for process <i>p</i>
<code>GetProcHeap(<i>p</i>)</code>	Get the heap base for process <i>p</i>
<code>GetProcList()</code>	Enumerate processes
<code>GetDriverList()</code>	Enumerate device drivers

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
**Current implementation supports only  
Microsoft Windows XP**

# HyperDbg: The key advantages

- ★ A kernel debugger built on top of our framework
- ★ Offers common kernel-debugging features  
(e.g., setting breakpoints and watchpoints, single-stepping, ...)
- ★ OS-independent and grants complete transparency to guest OS and its applications




# HyperDbg: The key advantages



- ★ Transparent to the guest OS
- ★ (Almost) OS independent
- ★ Fault resistant
- ★ Debug **any** component, even critical ones (e.g., the scheduler, interrupt handlers, ...)
- ★ No need for a second machine (WinDbg)

# HyperDbg: The key advantages



- ★ Installed as the system *runs*
- ★ Direct interaction with the underlying hardware
- ★ No need to deprive or modify the guest OS
- ★ Software virtualizers are **not** so transparent. . .

Testing system virtual machines  
(ISSTA '10)

# HyperDbg: Graphical User Interface

```
+--[pid: 00000004; proc: System]-----=[ HyperDbg ]-----
| EAX=00000058 EBX=00000001 ECX=00002ee0 EDX=00000060 ESP=805507c4 EBP=805507d8 EIP=806f58af
| ES1=00000000 EDI=805507ff CR0=e001003b CR3=00039000 CR4=000026d9 CS=0008 EFLAGS=00000246
|-----|
| hot-key pressed
|
| executing command: disassemble 0x804df037
| 804df037: ff15c49b5500 call 0x80559bc4 <KeGdiFlushUserBatch>
| 804df03d: 58 pop %eax
| 804df03e: 5a pop %edx
| 804df03f: ff0538f6dfff inc 0xfffff630
| 804df045: 8bf2 mov %edx, %esi
| 804df047: 8b5f0c mov 0xc(%edi), %ebx
| 804df04a: 33c9 xor %ecx, %ecx
| 804df04c: 8a0c18 mov (%eax,%ebx), %cl
| 804df04f: 8b3f mov (%edi), %edi
| 804df051: 8b1c87 mov (%edi,%eax,4), %ebx
| 804df054: 2be1 sub %ecx, %esp
| 804df056: c1e902 shr $0x2, %ecx
| 804df059: 8bf0 mov %esp, %edi
| 804df05b: 3b3534f55500 cmp 0x8055f534, %esi
| 804df061: 0f83a9010000 jae 0x64x
| 804df067: f3a5 rep movsd
| 804df069: ffd3 call %ebx
| 804df06b: 8be5 mov %ebp, %esp
| 804df06d: 8b0d24f1dfff mov 0xfffff124, %ecx
| 804df073: 8b553c mov 0x3c(%ebp), %edx
| 804df076: 899134010000 mov %edx, 0x134(%ecx)
| 804df07c: fa cli
| 804df07d: f7457000000200 test $0x20000, 0x70(%ebp)
| 804df084: 7506 jnz 0x64x
| 804df086: f6456c01 testb $0x1, 0x6c(%ebp)
| 804df08a: 7408 jz 0x64x
| 804df08c: 8b1d24f1dfff mov 0xfffff124, %ebx
| 804df092: c6432e00 movb $0x0, 0x2e(%ebx)
| 804df096: 807b4a00 cmpl $0x0, 0x4a(%ebx)
| 804df09a: 7448 jz 0x64x
|
| end of command: disassemble 0x804df037
|
| executing command: backtrace 5
| [current] 806f58af
| [00] 805507d8 f85d14dc [i8042prt.sys]
| [01] 8055081c 804dad9f <KiInterruptDispatch00+61>
| [02] 80550840 f85f3062 [intelppm.sys]
| [03] 80550840 804dc0d7 <KiSwapProcess00+121>
| [04] 8f4ff900 fdfdf900
|
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|-----|
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| 804df069: ffd4
| 804df06b: 8ba4
| 804df06d: 8b00
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| 804df076: 8990
| 804df07c: fa00
| 804df07d: f743
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| 804df086: f6456c01 testb $0x1, 0x6c(%ebp)
| 804df08a: 7458 je 0x64x
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| [04] 804df990 ffd4f980
| end of command: backtrace 5
|-----|
| >
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Information about the state of the guest  
(also provides OS-dependent details)

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| 804df06d: 8b00 mov %ebp, %eax
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| 804df076: 89100000 mov %edx, %eax
| 804df07c: fa cll
| 804df07d: f7a0000000 test 0x20000, 0x70(%ebp)
| 804df084: 75000000 jnz 0x8055f504 <KeGdiFlushUserBatch>
| 804df086: f6456c01 testb $0x1, 0x6c(%ebp)
| 804df08a: 74000000 jz 0x64x
| 804df08c: 8b1d24f1dfff mov 0xfffff124, %ebx
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Information about what triggered HyperDbg



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```
+--[pid: 00000004; proc: System]---=[ HyperDbg ]---
| EAX=00000058 EBX=00000001 ECX=00002ee0 EDX=00000060 ESP=805507c4 EBP=805507d8 EIP=806f58af
| ES1=00000000 EDI=805507ff CR0=e001003b CR3=00039000 CR4=000026d9 CS=0008 EFLAGS=00000246
|-----|
| hot-key pressed
|
| executing command: disassemble 0x804df037
| 804df037: ff15c49b5500 call 0x80559bc4 <KeGdiFlushUserBatch>
| 804df03d: 58 pop %eax
| 804df03e: 5a pop %edx
| 804df03f: ff0538f6dfff inc 0xfffff630
| 804df045: 8bf2 mov %edx, %esi
| 804df047: 8b5f0c mov 0xc(%edi), %ebx
| 804df04a: 33c9 xor %ecx, %ecx
| 804df04c: 8a0c18 mov (%eax,%ebx), %cl
| 804df04f: 8b3f mov (%edi), %edi
| 804df051: 8b1c87 mov (%edi,%eax,4), %ebx
| 804df054: 2be1 sub %ecx, %esp
| 804df056: c1e902 shr $0x2, %ecx
| 804df059: 8bf0 mov %esp, %edi
| 804df05b: 3b3534f55500 cmp 0x8055f534, %esi
| 804df061: 0f83a9010000 jae 0x64x
| 804df067: f3a5 rep movsd
| 804df069: ffd3 call %ebx
| 804df06b: 8be5 mov %ebp, %esp
| 804df06d: 8b0d24f1dfff mov 0xfffff124, %ecx
| 804df073: 8b553c mov 0x3c(%ebp), %edx
| 804df076: 899134010000 mov %edx, 0x134(%ecx)
| 804df07c: fa cli
| 804df07d: f7457000000200 test $0x20000, 0x70(%ebp)
| 804df084: 7506 jnz 0x64x
| 804df086: f6456c01 testb $0x1, 0x6c(%ebp)
| 804df08a: 7408 jz 0x64x
| 804df08c: 8b1d24f1dfff mov 0xfffff124, %ebx
| 804df092: c6432e00 movb $0x0, 0x2e(%ebx)
| 804df096: 807b4a00 cmpl $0x0, 0x4a(%ebx)
| 804df09a: 7448 jz 0x64x
| end of command: disassemble 0x804df037
|
| executing command: backtrace 5
| [current] 806f58af
| [00] 805507d8 f85d14dc [i8042prt.sys]
| [01] 8055081c 804dad9f <KiInterruptDispatch00+61>
| [02] 80550840 f85f3062 [intelppm.sys]
| [03] 80550840 804dc0d7 <KiSwapProcess00+121>
| [04] 8ffff900 ffdff900
| end of command: backtrace 5
|-----|
| >
```

Output

# HyperDbg: Graphical User Interface

```
+--[pid: 00000004; proc: System]-----=[ HyperDbg ]-----
| EAX=00000058 EBX=00000001 ECX=00002ee0 EDX=00000060 ESP=805507c4 EBP=805507d8 EIP=806f58af
| ES1=00000000 EDI=805507ff CR0=e001003b CR3=00039000 CR4=000026d9 CS=0008 EFLAGS=00000246
|-----
| hot-key pressed
|
| executing command: disassemble 0x804df037
| 804df037: ff15c49b5500 call 0x80559bc4 <KeGdiFlushUserBatch>
| 804df03d: 58 pop %eax
| 804df03e: 5a pop %edx
| 804df03f: ff0538f6dfff inc 0xfffff30
| 804df045: 8bf2 mov %edx, %esi
| 804df047: 8b5f0c mov 0xc(%edi), %ebx
| 804df04a: 33c9 xor %ecx, %ecx
| 804df04c: 8a0c18 mov (%eax,%ebx), %cl
| 804df04f: 8b3f mov (%edi,%edi), %edi
| 804df051: 8b1c87 mov (%edi,%eax,4), %ebx
| 804df054: 2be1 sub %ecx, %esp
| 804df056: c1e902 shr $0x2, %ecx
| 804df059: 8bf0 mov %esp, %edi
| 804df05b: 3b3534f55580 cmp 0x8055f34, %esi
| 804df061: 0f83a9010000 jmp 0x8055f34
| 804df067: f3a5 jmp %eax
| 804df069: ffd3 call %ebx
| 804df06b: 8be5 mov %esp, %eax
| 804df06d: 8b0d24f1dfff mov %eax, %eax
| 804df073: 8b553c mov %eax, %eax
| 804df076: 899134010000 mov %edx, %eax
| 804df07c: fa cll
| 804df07d: f74570000000 test $0x20000, 0x70(%ebp)
| 804df084: 7506 jmp %eax
| 804df086: f6456c01 testb $0x1, 0x6c(%ebp)
| 804df08a: 7458 jmp %eax
| 804df08c: 8b1d24f1dfff je 0x64x
| 804df092: c6432e00 movb 0xfffff124, %ebx
| 804df096: 807b4a00 movb 0x0, 0x2e(%ebx)
| 804df09a: 7448 cmpl 0x0, 0x4a(%ebx)
| 804df09c: jz 0x64x
| end of command: disassemble 0x804df037
|
| executing command: backtrace 5
| [current] 806f58af
| [00] 805507d8 f85d14dc [i8042prt.sys]
| [01] 8055081c 804dad9f <KiInterruptDispatch@0+61>
| [02] 80550840 f85f3062 [intelppm.sys]
| [03] 80550840 804dc0d7 <KiSwapProcess@0+121>
| [04] 804df980 fdfdf980
| end of command: backtrace 5
|-----
| >
```

Resolve symbols (OS-Dependent)

# HyperDbg: Graphical User Interface

```
+--[pid: 00000004; proc: System]-----=[ HyperDbg ]-----
| EAX=00000058 EBX=00000001 ECX=00002e08 EDX=00000060 ESP=805507c4 EBP=805507d8 EIP=806f58af
| ES1=00000000 EDI=805507ff CR0=e001003b CR3=00039000 CR4=000026d9 CS=0008 EFLAGS=00000246
|-----|
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| executing command: disassemble 0x804df037
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| 804df03d: 58 pop %eax
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| 804df045: 8bf2 mov %edx, %esi
| 804df047: 8b5f0c mov 0xc(%edi), %ebx
| 804df04a: 33c9 xor %ecx, %ecx
| 804df04c: 8a0c18 mov (%eax,%ebx), %cl
| 804df04f: 8b3f mov (%edi), %edi
| 804df051: 8b1c87 mov (%edi,%eax,4), %ebx
| 804df054: 2be1 sub %ecx, %esp
| 804df056: c1e902 shr $0x2, %edi
| 804df059: 8bf0 mov %esp, %edi
| 804df05b: 3b3534f55580 cmp 0x8055f534, %esi
| 804df061: 0f83a9010000 jmp 0x8055f534 <KeGdiFlushUserBatch>
| 804df067: f3a5 call %eax
| 804df069: ffd3 call %ebx
| 804df06b: 8be5 mov %ebp, %eax
| 804df06d: 8b0d24f1dfff mov %edx, 114(%ecx)
| 804df073: 8b553c mov %edx, 114(%ecx)
| 804df076: 899134010000 test 0x20000, 0x70(%ebp)
| 804df07c: fa cll
| 804df07d: f745700000000000 test 0x20000, 0x70(%ebp)
| 804df084: 7506 jnz 0x8055f534 <KeGdiFlushUserBatch>
| 804df086: f6456c01 testb $0x1, 0xc(%ebp)
| 804df08a: 7458 jz 0x64x
| 804df08c: 8b1d24f1dfff je 0x64x
| 804df092: c6432e00 movb 0x0, 0xc(%ebx)
| 804df096: 807b4a00 cmpl $0x0, 0xa(%ebx)
| 804df09a: 7448 jz 0x64x
| end of command: disassemble 0x804df037
|
| executing command: backtrace 5
| [current] 806f58af
| [00] 805507d8 f85d14dc [i8042prt.sys]
| [01] 8055081c 804dad9f <KiInterruptDispatch00+61> [intelppm.sys]
| [02] 80550840 f85f3062
| [03] 80550840 804dc0d7 <KiSwapProcess00+121>
| [04] 8f4df980 fdfdf980
| end of command: backtrace 5
|-----|
| >
```

Module name (OS-Dependent)

## User interface

- ★ We cannot rely on the guest OS graphic libraries
- ★ A small VGA driver to interact with the system's video card
- ★ The driver is neither OS nor hardware dependent

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- ★ We cannot rely on the guest OS graphic libraries
- ★ A small VGA driver to interact with the system's video card
- ★ The driver is neither OS nor hardware dependent

## User interaction

- ★ An user can activate HyperDbg by pressing an hot-key
- ★ In non-root mode keystrokes are intercepted by leveraging VT-x functionalities (i.e., IOOperationPort events)
- ★ In root mode a simple driver reads the keystrokes

# In summary

# In summary

## Contributions

A framework to perform dynamic system-level analyses of commodity production systems

### Features

1. Does not require any native support for the analysis  
(can be used on commodity or closed-source systems)
2. Supports the analysis of running systems  
(the target must not be rebooted)
3. User- and system-level code cannot detect nor affect the analysis infrastructure
4. Guarantees isolation of the analysis tools running on its top  
(a buggy tool does not cause the target system to crash)

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# In summary

## Contributions


A framework to perform dynamic system-level analyses of commodity production systems

### Features

1. Does not require any native support for the analysis (can be used on commodity or closed-source systems)
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## Architecture



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# In summary

## Contributions


A framework to perform dynamic system-level analyses of commodity production systems

### Features


1. Does not require any native support for the analysis (can be used on commodity or closed-source systems)
2. Supports the analysis of running systems (the target must not be rebooted)
3. User- and system-level code cannot detect nor affect the analysis infrastructure
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## Architecture



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# Dynamic and Transparent Analysis of Commodity Production Systems

<http://code.google.com/p/hyperdbg>

**Thank you!**  
**Any questions?**

**Aristide Fattori**

`aristide@security.dico.unimi.it`


**Backup slides**

# Watchpoints: Details

- ★ Interrupt execution of memory access (read/write)
- ★ Implemented by protecting memory pages and trapping access exceptions

# Watchpoints: Details


- ★ Interrupt execution of memory access (read/write)
- ★ Implemented by protecting memory pages and trapping access exceptions



Monitor any access to a given memory address

# Watchpoints: Details


- ★ Interrupt execution of memory access (read/write)
- ★ Implemented by protecting memory pages and trapping access exceptions



Remove any permission from the target page

# Watchpoints: Details

- ★ Interrupt execution of memory access (read/write)
- ★ Implemented by protecting memory pages and trapping access exceptions




Further accesses trigger a CPU exception



# Watchpoints: Details


- ★ Interrupt execution of memory access (read/write)
- ★ Implemented by protecting memory pages and trapping access exceptions



If the faulty addr. matches a watchpoint, dispatch the event

# Watchpoints: Details


- ★ Interrupt execution of memory access (read/write)
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Restore the original permissions to resume the execution

# Watchpoints: Details

- ★ Interrupt execution of memory access (read/write)
- ★ Implemented by protecting memory pages and trapping access exceptions



To **hide** watchpoints we modify the entry in which the page table is mapped  
(i.e.: we install a Shadow Page Table into the guest operating system with stricter permission than the original PT)

# Late launching

- ★ The target system becomes the **guest** of a virtual machine
- ★ The VMCS is configured to reflect the current state of the guest
- ★ When the framework installation is over, the control is returned to the guest
- ★ The CPU restores the guest state from the VMCS  
(so that the guest execution is resumed just as nothing happened)